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SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP  
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019  
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) HEAD OF DELEGATION LUNCH FOR FEDERATION  
COUNCIL MEMBERS, NOVEMBER 24, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-049.

12. (U) Meeting Date: November 24, 2009  
Time: 1:15 p.m. - 2:45 p.m.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

Participants:

U.S.	RUSSIA
A/S Gottemoeller	Amb Antonov
Ms. Purcell (notetaker)	Amb Dzasokhov
	Mr. Ozerov
	Mr. Leontiev (notetaker)

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SUMMARY  
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13. (S) A/S Gottemoeller hosted two senior members of Russia's Federation Council to a lunch on November 24, 2009. The meeting was very cordial and the legislators expressed heartfelt support for the success of the treaty negotiations and emphasized the great interest in the treaty within the Federal Assembly and the political leadership in Russia. They insisted on reciprocity and compromise on both sides. They indicated that movement on a reciprocal basis might be possible on verification issues, including telemetry and missile unique identifiers. End Summary.

¶4. (S) Subject Summary: Legislators Support Treaty; Legislators Delve Into Treaty Issues; Missile Defense Cooperation Prospects; and, Treaty Ratification.

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LEGISLATORS SUPPORT TREATY  
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¶5. (S) On November 24, 2009, Gottemoeller hosted a lunch for visiting Russian Federation Council representatives Alexander Dzasokhov and Victor Ozerov. Dzasokhov is a member of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs, as well as a former President of North Ossetia, a Politburo member in 1990-1991, and USSR Ambassador to Syria in 1986-1988. Ozerov is Chairman of the Federation Council and Chairman of the Defense and Security Committee, and a former Army officer.

¶6. (S) The Russian representatives explained that Russian President Medvedev was very interested in the START Follow-on negotiations and valued the work of the two delegations highly. The President wanted to send some representatives of the Federal Assembly to visit Geneva when he heard that some U.S. Senators had visited Geneva, so that they would be well-informed regarding the progress of the negotiations.

¶7. (S) Amb Antonov inquired into what CJCS Mullen's mood was when he departed Geneva that morning. Gottemoeller reported that Mullen's mood was good following his last coffee with Gen Makarov. He had found his meetings with Makarov to be

productive. Gottemoeller asked how Makarov's mood was; Ozerov replied that he and Dzasokhov had met with Makarov that morning, and Makarov believed the treaty should be signed.

¶8. (S) Dzasokhov said the message he wanted to convey to the United States was that Russia's public and its leadership all had very high expectations for the START Follow-on treaty. The Federal Assembly leadership and opposition were extremely interested in the negotiations. He and Ozerov had skipped an important plenary session because they considered it important to come to Geneva for 2 days and meet with the Russian delegation.

¶9. (S) Gottemoeller commented that the U.S. Senate was also very interested in the negotiations; they asked her for briefings whenever she came back to Washington. Her hope was that the Senate's high interest in her briefings would produce positive results in the ratification process. The Russian representatives showed interest in receiving similar briefings, causing nervous laughter from Antonov.

¶10. (S) Dzasokhov continued that Moscow had been pleased to see some fundamental changes under the Obama Administration, including a changed U.S. approach to key strategic issues. Russia approves of the ongoing negotiations in a wide variety of areas. The Federation Council hoped for a successful conclusion of a START Follow-on treaty that would be fair and entail equal obligations for both parties. Reciprocity was a very important and sensitive issue for Russia. If negotiations on disarmament were not successful, it would be much more difficult for the United States and Russia to work together on important regional problems such as Afghanistan, Iraq, terrorism, and nonproliferation. In addition, if there were good results with the new treaty in December, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference could open on a positive note in 2010. Antonov interjected that he and Gottemoeller were doing everything they could to reach a successful conclusion to the negotiations.

¶11. (S) Gottemoeller noted that several complex issues remained in the negotiations, such as verification issues for mobile ICBMs and the central limits. There were no insurmountable obstacles to signing in December, however. START provided a very good historical basis for agreement.

Russia's initial draft had been helpful in identifying ways to simplify the STAR text; the U.S. side had rethought some items after receiving Russia's first proposed text. The key was to find a balance between the predictability provided by the START regime and the flexibility provided by the Moscow Treaty. Gottemoeller had told the members of the U.S. Senate that the new treaty would be different from START, with verification measures adapted from START, but simplified and made less expensive to implement, as the Presidents had called for in their July 2009 Joint Understanding. Both Parties needed flexibility so that they could modernize their forces. Ozerov responded that the Federation Council likewise believed the new treaty should be shorter and less complicated than START.

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LEGISLATORS DELVE INTO TREATY ISSUES  
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¶12. (S) Ozerov raised the issue of verification of Russian mobile ICBMs. For the sake of reciprocity, he proposed that Russia be allowed to view U.S. submarines in exchange. He recognized that there were inevitable differences between the basing modes, but urged that Russian inspectors at least be allowed to view the submarines from pier side. Security issues were a priority for Russia. He wanted the Russian public to understand the United States better, and the U.S. public to understand Russia better. The treaty needed to be reciprocal, with compromises by both sides.

¶13. (S) Ozerov then mentioned telemetry as an issue where compromise was possible and noted that Makarov had spoken to him about it. Gottemoeller pressed the legislators regarding telemetry. Although the United States was not currently testing new types of missiles, if it occurred Russia would be very interested in obtaining telemetry from the flight tests. The United States was planning to test conventional warheads on ballistic missiles, and telemetry measures would permit Russia to obtain information from such tests. Ozerov seemed interested. Dzasokhov commented that non-nuclear missiles were better than nuclear missiles, but using them would risk escalation and proliferation.

¶14. (S) Dzasokhov asked what aggregate number of inspections the U.S. side was seeking. Gottemoeller replied that Col Ilin and Dr. Warner were both very expert and would certainly reach agreement in their working group on the right number of inspections. Dzasokhov expressed regret that Votkinsk had become an obstacle. As the birthplace of Tchaikovsky, Votkinsk should be a place of harmony and not disharmony. Gottemoeller emphasized that monitoring missile production at Votkinsk was important for the United States. While the United States did not produce as many missiles as the Russian Federation did at Votkinsk, it might do so in the future. Russia might therefore have an interest in monitoring production at the U.S. first stage assembly facilities in Utah, so that monitoring would be reciprocal. Ozerov did not show interest in the proposal, but stated he believed that providing unique identifiers for missiles would not be difficult and could be a good confidence-building measure. He added that the verification regime should be simpler and less expensive overall, with fewer inspections and less concern about insignificant details.

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MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION PROSPECTS  
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¶15. (S) Gottemoeller raised the U.S. interest in missile defense cooperation with Russia, and stated her view that cooperation would provide Russia a good opportunity both to keep abreast of U.S. developments in missile defense, and have a role in developing missile defense concepts and technology for the future protection of all Eurasia. This would be good for both countries. She noted that Under Secretary Tauscher would be visiting Moscow in December to

begin talks on missile defense cooperation. The Russian representatives agreed with Gottemoeller's views, adding that the conclusion of the treaty would also promote cooperation, while failure to conclude the treaty would encourage those in Russia who still held Cold War views and those outside Russia

who did not want the United States and Russia to work together. Russia had great intellectual and scientific potential and could contribute to cooperative development. Antonov broke in to note he had frequently said to Gottemoeller that when the United States and Russia worked together, they could do anything, whether others liked it or not. He cited the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism as an example of such cooperation.

¶16. (S) Dzasokhov commented on Iran, saying its revolution was not imported but resulted from an internal rethinking. Iran was different from other countries and could not be influenced from the outside. Russia wanted Iran to become a modern country.

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TREATY RATIFICATION  
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¶17. (S) Gottemoeller noted that as soon as the treaty was signed, she would return to Washington and begin working with the Senate on ratification. Ozerov agreed that the chief negotiators were the most powerful lobbyists for their treaties. Gottemoeller expressed hope for Senate advice and consent to treaty ratification by May 2010, although that depended on signing the treaty in December. Ratification was even more important than signature, making the legislators' role very important. Ozerov suggested a joint Russian Federal Assembly-U.S. Senate group to review the treaty for ratification. Antonov interjected that it was important not to repeat the experience of START-II, which Russia ratified while the United States did not.

¶18. (S) Dzasokhov concluded that political will among leaders to maintain a good relationship enabled solution of any challenges, as the United States and the Soviet Union did in World War II. He valued the relationship between the U.S. and Russian Presidents and wished them success in their efforts to improve relations. This was in the fundamental interests of both peoples, even though Russia would maintain its positions and believed that a multipolar world was best. Dzasokhov closed by saying the lunch was very tasty and the friendly atmosphere had made it even more tasty.

¶19. (S) Documents exchanged: None.

¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
GRIFFITHS